State of Utah v. Clinton Perank : Amicus Brief by Utah Supreme Court
Brigham Young University Law School
BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Supreme Court Briefs
1986
State of Utah v. Clinton Perank : Amicus Brief
Utah Supreme Court
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_sc1
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief Submitted to the Utah Supreme Court; digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law
Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah; machine-generated
OCR, may contain errors.
David L. Wilkinson; Attorney General; Dallin W. Jensen; solicitor General; Earl F. Dorius; Assistant
Attorney General; Michael M. Quealy; Assistant Attorney General; Attorneys for Respondent.
Kirk C. Bennett; Bennett and Judd; Attorneys for Appellant. Tom D. Tobin; Alvin Pahlke; Susan W.
Pahlke; Alvin G. Nash; Unitah County Attorney; Herbert Wm. Gillespie; Duchesne County
Attorney; Attorneys for Duchesne and Unitah Counties, Amici Curiae
This Legal Brief is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Supreme Court
Briefs by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. Policies regarding these Utah briefs are available at
http://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/utah_court_briefs/policies.html. Please contact the Repository Manager at hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu with
questions or feedback.
Recommended Citation
Legal Brief, Utah v. Perank, No. 860196.00 (Utah Supreme Court, 1986).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_sc1/1078
UTAH SUPREME OOlittt' 
jTAH 
1QCUMEN 
< F U 
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE 
STATE OF UTAH 
-,r>. 
Q($QNR N®. MJA-Il; ———" 
Pla in tiff/Responoeh t, 
v. 
CLINTON PERANK, 
Defendant /Appellant. 
Casfe No. 860196 
Priority 2 
(Supreme Court No. 860243} 
BRIEF OF DUCHESNE AND UINTAH 
AMICI CURIAE, IN SUPPORT OF 
qOUNTIES, 
PONDENT RES 
ON APPEAL FROM AN ORDER OF 
THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR DUCHESNE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH, 
THE HONORABLE RICHARD C. DAVIDSON J PRESIDING, 
REVOKING THE PROBATION OF DEFENDANT/APPELLANT, 
AND EXECUTING A SENTENCE OF OH 5 YEARS 
IN THE UTAH STATE PRISON 
FOR THE OFFENSE OF BURGLARY, 
A THIRD DEGREE FELONY 
DAVID L. WILKINSON 
Attorney General 
DALLIN W. JENSEN 
Solicitor General 
EARL F. DORIUS 
Assistant Attorney General 
MICHAEL M. O.UEALY 
Assistant Attorney General 
236 State Capitol Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114 
Attorneys for Respondent 
KIRK C. BENNETT 
BENNETT AND JUDD 
319 West 100 South, Suite B 
Vernal, Utah 84078 
TOM D. TOB IN 
ALVIN PAHJLKE 
SUSAN W. 
Tobin Law| 
422 Main 
Winner, S 
ALVIN G. 
PAHLKE 
Offices, P.C. 
Street 
uth Dakota 57580 
ASH Uintah County Attorney 
HERBERT win. GILLESPIE 
Duchesne County Attorney 
Duchesne County Courthouse 
Center and 100 South Street 
Duchesne, Utah 84021 
Attorneys for Duchesne 
and Uintah Counties, 
Amici Curiae 
Attorneys for Appellant 
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE 
STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plain tiff/Respondent, 
v. 
CLINTON PERANK, 
Defendant/Appellant. 
Cade No. 860196 
priority 2 
(Supreme Court No. 860243) 
BRIEF OF DUCHESNE AND UINTAH COUNTIES, 
AMICI CURIAE, IN SUPPORT OF RESPONDENT 
ON APPEAL FROM AN ORDER OF 
THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICt COURT 
IN AND FOR DUCHESNE COUNTY, STATUE OF UTAH, 
THE HONORABLE RICHARD C. DAVIDSON, PRESIDING, 
REVOKING THE PROBATION OF DEFENDANT/APPELLANT, 
AND EXECUTING A SENTENCE OF 0*5 YEARS 
IN THE UTAH STATE PRISON 
FOR THE OFFENSE OF BURGLARY, 
A THIRD DEGREE FELONY 
DAVID L. WILKINSON 
Attorney General 
DALLIN W. JENSEN 
Solicitor General 
EARL F. DORIUS 
Assistant Attorney General 
MICHAEL M. 
Assistant 
236 State 
QUEALY 
Attorney General 
Capitol Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114 
Attorneys for Respondent 
KIRK C. BENNETT 
BENNETT AND JUDD 
319 West 100 South, Suite B 
Vernal, Utah 84078 
TOM D. T0BIN 
ALVIN PAHLKE 
SUSAN W. PAHLKE 
Tobin Law Offices, P.C. 
422 Main,Street 
Winner, South Dakota 57580 
ALVIN G. INASH 
Uintah Ccjunty Attorney 
HERBERT Wp. GILLESPIE 
Duchesne County Attorney 
Duchesne County Courthouse 
Center and 100 South Street 
Duchesne, Utah 84021 
Attorneys for Duchesne 
and Uintah Counties, 
Amici Curiae 
Attorneys for Appellant 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
Page 
ARGUMENT
 r 2 
CONCLUSION
 + 17 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
i 
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES 
I. CASES CITED: Page 
Andrus v. Utah, 446 U.S. 500 (1980) 5 
Brough v. Appawora, 553 P.2d 934 (Utah 1976), vacated 
Mem. 431 U.S. 901 (1977) 3, 8, 10 
Cardin v. De La Cruz, 671 F.2d 363 (9th Cir.), cert. 
denied, 459 U.S. 967 (1982) 6 
Colville Confederated Tribes v. Walton, 647 F.2d 42 
(9th Cir.), cert, denied, 454 U.S. 1092 
(1981) 6 
Confederated Salish and Kootenai Tribe v. Nkmen, 66 5 
F.2d 951 (9th Cir.), cert, denied, 459 U.S. 9 77 
(1982) 6 
Confederated Tribes and Band of the Yakima jTndian 
Nation v. Whiteside et al."7~828 F.2d 529 (9th 
Cir. 1987), cert, granted, June 20, 19|38, 56 
U.S.L.W. 3859 (U.S. June 21, 1988) 
(No. 87-1622) 6 
DeCoteau v. District County Court, 87 S.D. £55, 211 
N.W.2d 843 (1973), aff'd, 4l0 U.S. 4 25 
(1975) 2, 3 
DeCoteau v. District County Court, 420 U.S. 425 
(1975) . . 2, 3, 10 
Iowa Mutual v. LaPlante, 107 S.Ct. 971 (1987) . . . . 5 
Knight v. Shoshone and Arapahoe Indian Tribes, 670 
F.2d 900 (10th Cir. 1982) . . . . . 6 
Oliphant v. Suguamish Indian Tribe, 435 U.S. 191 
(1978) . . 5 
Rosebud Sioux Tribe v. Kneip, 430 U.S. 584 (1977) . . 10, 15 
Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 436 U.S. 49 (1978). . 8 
Sioux Tribe of Indians v. United States, 316| U.S. 
317 (1942) 9 
Snow v. Quinault Indian Tribe, 709 F.2d 1319 (9th 
Cir. 1983), cert, denied, 467 U.S. 1214 (1984) . 6 
Solem v. Bartlett, 465 U.S. 463 (1984) 2, 3, 7, 12-14 
ii 
South Carolina et al. v. Catawba Indian Tribe, Inc., 
476 U.S. 498 (1986) 
South Dakota v. Janis, 317 N.W.2d 133 (S.D. 1982), 
rev'd sub nom."~s"olem v. Bar tie tt, 465 U.S. 
463 (1984) . 
Sovards v. Meagher, 37 Utah 212, 108 P. 1112 (1910) 
Stankey v. Waddell, 256 N.W.2d 117 (S.D. 1977), 
rev'd sub nom. Solem v. Bartlett, 465 U.S. 
463 (1984) .
 k . . . . 
Uintah and White River Bands of Indians v. United 
States, 139 Ct. CI. 1 (1957) . . . . . . . . 
United States v. Anderson, 736 F.2d 1358 (9th Cir. 
1984)
 t . . . , 
United States v. Pelican, 232 U.S. 442 (1914) . . , 
United States ex rel. Condon v. Erickson, ^78 F.2d 
684 (8th Cir. 1973), aff'd sub nom. Scfrlem v. 
Bartlett, 465 U.S. 463 (1984) TT". J . . . . 
United States ex rel. Feather v. Erickson, 489 
F.2d 99 (8th Cir. 1973) rev'd sub nom. 
DeCoteau v. District County Court, 420 U.S. 
425 (1975) . . . . . . . . . . . . . < . . 
Ute Indian Tribe v. State of Utah, 773 F.2d 1087 
(10th Cir. 1985), cert, denied, 107 ujs. 596 
(Dec. 1, 1986) 
Ute Indian Tribe, Lester Chapoose, Chairman, Ute 
Indian Tribe v. State of Utah, Utah Tcjx 
Commission, Duchesne County, Utah7 (b. Utah) 
(No. 87-C0130G) 
Whiterocks Irrigation Co. v. Mooseman, 45 Utah 79, 
141 P. 459 (1914) 
II. MISCELLANEOUS AUTHORITIES: 
Brief Amicus Curiae of Santa Fe Mining, Inc. in 
Support of the Petition for Certiorari, On 
Petition for a Writ of Certiorari to the 
United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth 
Circuit, Ute Indian Tribe v. State of btah, 
773 F.2d 1087 (10th Cir. 1985), cert, denied 
107 U.S. 596 (1986) 
iii 
Brief for the States of South Dakota, et at. as 
Amici Curiae in Support of Petitioner^, On 
Petition for a Writ of Certiorari to the 
United States Court of Appeals for th$ Tenth 
Circuit, Ute Indian Tribe v. State of Utah, 
773 F.2d 1087 (10th Cir. 1985), ceftT 
denied, 107 U.S. 596 (1986) . . . .
 4 . . . 4, 10, 11-12,13 
Business Committee Found in Contempt, Ute bulletin, 
Ute Bulletin, April 27, 1988 at 1, col. 1. . . . 4 
Complaint for Refund of Taxes, Declaratory and Injunctive 
Relief, Ute Indian Tribe, Lester Chapc|)ose, Chairman, 
Ute IndiaiTTribe v. State of Utah, Utcjh State Tax 
Commission, Duchesne County, Utah, (D. Utah) 
(No. 87-C-0130G) 
Hoover and LaFave, Congressional Intent Regarding 
Jurisdiction on Ceded Indian Land During the 
Allotment Era, Part I; History, and Ijart II 
The Law, Joint Paper Delivered to the [Western 
History Association, in Billings, Montjana 
(Oct. 17, 1986) 14-15 
Hoxie, Beyond Savagery: The Campaign to Assimilate 
the American Indians, 1880-1920 . . .| 10 
Jones, Sovereign Nation, American Politics, 
Feb. 1988 at 31 1 
Letter from Russell J. McClure to Don Listop . . . . 7 
Letter from Wayne Ducheneaux to Kenn A. Pugh . . . . 7 
Letter from Roger Tellinghuisen to Geoffrey J. 
Butler 13 
Letter from Vern Hamre, Regional Forester, 
(Apr. 8, 1987) United States Forest Service 
to Scott M. Matheson, Governor of Utah 16 
Statement of R. Dennis Ickes to the United States 
Commission on Civil Rights of Aug. 14, 1987 . . 1/4, 7-8 
Statement of R. Dennis Ickes to the United $tates 
Commission on Civil Rights of Jan. 28, 1988 . . 4 
Supplement to the Statement of R. Dennis Ickes 
to the United States Commission on Civ|l 
Rights of Aug. 14, 1987 4 
Ute Law and Order Code (19 75) 7 
iv 
IN THE SUPREME COURT OFl THE 
STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff/Respondent, 
v. 
CLINTON PERANK, 
De fenda nt/Appellant. 
C^se No, 860196 
» Priority 2 
' (Supreme Court No. 860196) 
BRIEF OF DUCHESNE AND UINTAH (COUNTIES, 
AMICI CURIAE, IN SUPPORT OF RESPONDENT 
This Brief for the counties of Duchesne and Uintah, amici 
curiae, is submitted by stipulation and pursuant to the Order of 
the Court dated November 10, 19 87. Amici ^dopt the STATEMENT OF 
THE ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL, STATUTORY PROVISIONS, and STATE-
MENT OF THE CASE of the Brief of Respondent State of Utah. 
Duchesne and Uintah Counties are the units of local government 
most directly affected by the recent resurrection of the original 
reservation boundaries at issue here. Population and land 
statistics, as well as a general discussion of some of the 
problems of being suddenly thrust into the status of residents of 
an Indian reservation, where their officials have only limited 
jurisdiction and where they have no elective voice in the gover-
nance of their affairs and property by the Ute Indian Tribe, are 
set forth in detail in the Addendum at 4-11 L 
1 
ARGUMENT 
A. The denial of certiorari in Ute Indian Tribe v. State of 
Utah, 773 F.2d 1087 (10th Cir. 1985), cert^ denied, 107 U.S. 596 
(Dec. 1, 1986), carries with it no implication whatever regarding 
the views of the United States Supreme Cour|t on the merits. See, 
Brief for Respondent State of Utah, at ^. It is also beyond 
question that this Court has a right to it$ own view on reserva-
tion status. See, DeCoteau v. District Cbunty Court, 420 U.S. 
425, 430-431 (1975) and Solem v. Bartlett, 465 U.S. 463, 466 
(1984), where the United States Supreme C<j>urt expressly granted 
certiorari in both instances because a State Supreme Court 
reached a conclusion opposite that of a Federal Appellate Court 
when construing the same reservation disestablishment statutes. 
DeCoteau presented the status of the Lake Traverse Reservation, 
which the State Supreme Court found to be 4isestaklished and the 
Federal Appellate Court disagreed. DeCoteau v. District County 
Court, 87 S.D. 555, 211 N.W. 2d 843 (1973) |, aff fd, 420 U.S. 425 
(1975); United States ex. rel. Feather v. Ejrickson, 489 F. 2d 99 
(8th Cir. 1973), revfd sub nom. DeCoteaiji v. District County 
Court, 420 U.S. 425 (1975). Solem presented the status of the 
Cheyenne River Reservation, which the Statue Supreme Court also 
found to be disestablished and the Federal appellate Court again 
disagreed. Stankey v. Waddell, 256 N.W. 2d 117 (S.D. 1977), 
revfd sub, nom. Solem v. Bartlett, 465 U.S. 463 (1984); South 
Dakota v. Janis, 317 N.W. 2d 133 (S.D. 1^82), rev'd sub nom. 
Solem v. Bartlett, 465 U.S. 463 (1984); Urjited States ex. rel. 
2 
Condon v. Erickson, 478 F. 2d 684 (8th Cirj. 1973) , aff'd sub nom. 
Solem v, Bartlett, 465 U.S. 463 (1984). 
In DeCoteau, the State Supreme Court1fc view prevailed and in 
Solem, the Federal Appellate Court's vi^w prevailed. In each 
instance, however, the right of the St^ ate Supreme Court to 
independently decide reservation status wa^ never in doubt. 
In fact, the right of the Utah Supreme Court to indepen-
dently evaluate the Ute issue was specifically noted by the 
United States in its effort to convince th^ United States Supreme 
Court that a grant of certiorari in Ute Iridian Tribe v. State of 
Utah, would be premature. After pointing out the lack of a 
conflict because Brough v. Appawora was pot resolved on remand 
(but neglecting to point out why), the United States reminded the 
Court that there would be "time enough" ior the Court to grant 
review if the Utah Supreme Court should "in some future case" 
adhere to its prior view. Brief for the u|nited States as Amicus 
Curiae at 15, Ute Indian Tribe, R. Vol. 5^ IX at 30. A conflict 
between a state supreme court and a court of appeals is practi-
cally a prerequisite for certiorari to be granted in cases of 
this nature. Amici would submit that this LS the case and now is 
the time for the view of this Court to be expressed. 
Certainly this Court should have an opportunity to at least 
comment upon the position of the United S|tates that the issues 
here are of "little practical importance", Brief for the United 
Brough v. Appawora, 553 P. 2d 934 (Utah 1976), vacated, 
Mem, 431 U.S. 901 (1977) . 
3 
States as Amicus Curiae at 17, Ute Indian Tribe, The en banc 
majority has now fashioned the second largest Indian reservation 
in the United States in northeastern Utah, Throughout this four 
million acre "Indian reservation", eighteen thousand non-Indian 
inhabitants live and work. In a recent Tribal election, in 1985, 
a total of four hundred thirty votes wer^ cast for all candi-
2 dates. Some of the problems inherent in such an "Indian 
reservation" were recently brought to the Attention of the United 
States Commission on Civil Rights. Others will surface for 
years as the Ute Indian Tribe determines the remainder of the 
rights to which it is now entitled as a (result of this recent 
resurrection of the "Uintah and Ouray Reservation". 
In terms of actual litigation, present counsel for the Ute 
Indian Tribe represented to the United States Supreme Court that 
after a judicial recognition of original reservation boundaries, 
Petition for a Writ of Certiorari to the United States 
Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit, at 5 n,14, Ute Indian 
Tribe v. State of Utah, 773 F.2d 1087 (10th Cir. 1985) , certT 
denied, 107 U.S. 596 (Dec, 1, 1986) R. Vol. XIX at 25. In the 
recent tribal referendum on the enrollment controversy, a total 
of 426 votes were cast, 405 against the court-ordered back 
payment and 21 in favor of it. The news suihmary of this issue is 
Business Committee Found in Contempt, Ute| Bulletin, April 22, 
1988, at 1, col. 1, Addendum at 84. 
3 
Statement of R. Dennis Ickes on Behalf of Duchesne and 
Uintah Counties, Utah, to the United States Commission on Civil 
Rights, Flagstaff, Arizona, (Aug. 14, 1987); Addendum at 1. 
Supplement to the Statement of R. Dennis Ickes on Behalf of 
Duchesne and Uintah Counties, Utah to the United States Commis-
sion on Civil Rights, Flagstaff, Arizona (A|ug. 14, 1987) (Supple-
ment dated Aug. 24, 1987), Addendum at 61. 
Statement of R. Dennis Ickes on Behalf of Duchesne and 
Uintah Counties, Utah, to United States Commission on Civil 
Rights, Washington, D.C. (Jan. 28, 1988) , Addendum at 67. 
4 
lawsuits claiming millions of dollars would be filed against the 
4 
State of Utah and two Counties. In Februaryf 1987/ one such 
suit was in fact filed by the Ute Tribe in federal court against 
the State of Utah and the County of Duchesne, In addition to 
challenging the distribution of One Hundred Fifty Million Dollars 
($150/000/000.00), in federal mineral lease revenues, as well as 
the Utah Mining Occupation Tax and the Utah Oil and Gas Conserva-
tion Tax monies/ the suit also places in issue the validity of 
5 
the ad valorem property tax collected by Duchesne County. 
On a national level the United States $upreme Court has most 
recently signalled in Iowa Mutual v. LaPlante/ 107 S.Ct. 971 
(1987) / that tribal civil jurisdiction over nonmembers within the 
boundaries of any Indian reservation is, presumptively/ a very 
real possibility in the mind of the Court: 
Although the criminal jurisdiction of the tribal courts 
is subject to substantial federal limitation/ see 
Oliphant v. Suguamish Indian Tribe, 435 U.S. 191, 98 
S.Ct. 1011/ 55 L.Ed.2d 209 (1978)/ their civil juris-
diction is not similarly restricted. 
Tribal authority over the activities Of non-Indians on 
reservation lands is an important part of tribal 
sovereignty. 
Motion for Leave to Intervene/ at p. 15 Andrus v. Utah/ 
446 U.S. 500 (1980). 
5 
Complaint for Refund of Taxes, Declaratory and Injunctive 
Relief/ Ute Indian Tribe, Lester Chapoose/ Chairman/ Ute Indian 
Tribe v. State of Utah/ Utah Tax Commission/ Duchesne CountyT 
Utah. (D. Utah)(No. 87-C-0130G). Pursuant to a written Stipu-
lation / this case is currently being held in abeyance pending 
further "discussions". Complaint/ Addendum at 87. 
5 
Civil jurisdiction over such activities presumptive!y 
lies in the tribal courts unless affitmatively limited 
by a specific treaty provision or fedejral statute. 
107 S.Ct. at 976, 978 (19 87) (emphasis added). 
Dicta such as this has most recently prompted the Ninth 
Circuit court of appeals in Confederated Tfibes and Bands of the 
Yakima Indian Nation v. Whiteside et al., 8J28 F. 2d 529 (9th Cir. 
1987), cert, granted, June 20, 1988, 56 U.S.L.W. 3859, (U.S. June 
21, 1988) (No. 87-1622) to conclude that the Yakima Nation "has 
the authority to zone non-Indian fee land Within the reservation 
boundaries" in spite of a substantial nontIndian population and 
land base. Yakima Indian Nation at 5 35J. Nor is Yakima an 
isolated example. As early as 198 2, the tenth Circuit Court of 
Appeals held that: the Shoshone and Arapahoe Indian Tribes of the 
Wind River Reservation in Wyoming could zon^ non-Indian property, 
Knight v. Shoshone and Arapahoe Indian Tribfes, 670 F.2d 900 (10th 
Cir. 1982) . In some judicial minds, thife tribal authority to 
regulate non-Indian interests is to date virtually unlimited. 
Other examples of judicially recognized tribal jurisdiction over 
non-Indian interests include tribal health and safety regu-
lations, tribal land use regulations, tribal water regulations, 
and a host of other tribal assertions are yet to be resolved. 
Cardin v. De La Cruz, 671 F.2d 3l63 (9th Cir.), cert, 
denied, 459 U.S. 967 (198?); Snow v. Quin^ult Indian Tribe, 709 
F.2d 1319 (9th Cir. 1983), cert, denied, 467 U.S. 1214 (1984); 
Confederated Salish and Kootenai Tribes v. Namen, 665 F.2d 951, 
96l (9th Cir.), cert, denied, 459 U.S. 977 T1982) ; Colville 
Confederated Tribes v. Walton, 647 F.2d 42] 52 (9th Cir.), cert, 
denied, 454 U.S. 109? (1981); United States^  of America et al. v. 
Anderson, 736 F.2d 1358 (9th Cir. 1984). 
6 
The tribe involved in Solem, the Cheyenne I^ iver Sioux Tribe, did 
not waste any time in enacting and seeking federal enforcement of 
tribal business licenses and special liqjior permits from all 
affected non-members now living within the ^rea recently included 
7 
within their recognized Indian reservation boundaries. It has 
also, together with numerous other tribes, recently enacted 
Tribal Employment Rights Ordinances that levy excise taxes and 
dictate hiring practices throughout the reservation. The civil 
penalties for violations are onerous. See, the discussion of the 
Ute Law and Order Code, Supplemental Brief of Petitioner at 13, 
Ute Indian Tribe, R. Vol. XIX p. 31. In this and similar sit-
uations, tribal seizures of private property, tribal boycotts, 
and tribal threats of accual physical removal from the Indian 
reservation are not uncommon. In short, the consequences of 
non-member residency within an Indian reservation in 1988 are 
mind-boggling. 
In terms of constitutional rights, th^ non-members and the 
tribal members share the same frustration: As a practical 
matter, they have no constitutional rights vis-a-vis tribal 
government. As Mr. R. Dennis Ickes succinctly noted in his 
Letter from Wayne Ducheneaux, as Chairman of the Cheyenne 
River Sioux Tribe to Kenn A. Fugh, Attorney at Law (June 6, 1988, 
(with attached Resolution No. 126-88-CR dated May 7, 1988); 
Letter from Russell J. McClure, Bureau of Indian Affairs, Chey-
enne River Agency Superintendent, to Mr. Don Liston, Manager, 
Dupree City Package Liquor (Mar. 31, 1988), Addendum at 93-99. 
7 
testimony of August 14, 1987, before the United States Commission 
on Civil Rights: 
Indian tribal governments are not limited in the 
exercise of their powers by the Bill of Rights, the 
14th Amendment, or the United States Constitution. The 
1968 Indian Bill of Rights purportedly was enacted to 
restrict the tribal governments in many of the same 
ways as the Bill of Rights restricts the federal 
government. However, the U.S. Supremfe Court in Santa 
Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 436 U.S. 49 (1978) held that 
the Indian Civil Rights Act contained no private right 
of action against tribal government^ and held that 
tribal governments are immune from 
court. 
suit in federal 
Enforcement of the Indian Civil Rights Act today 
resides solely within the absolute discretion of tribal 
government, except for habeas corpus Actions. Whether 
any person who comes within the jurisdiction of a 
tribal government receives the intended benefits of the 
Act depends more upon the political discretion of a 
tribal council than upon the legal judgments of its 
tribal courts. This is so because there is no circum-
stance where a federal court can exercise judicial 
oversight, except in habeas corpus situations... 
Statement of R. Dennis Ickes on behalf oi Duchesne and Uintah 
Counties, Utah to the United States Commission on Civil Rights, 
Flagstaff, Arizona, (Aug. 14, 1987). 
When viewed in its entirety, no principle in Federal Indian 
Law or documentation in the Ute legislation can be fairly said to 
require this scenario in Utah. Certainly, the opinion of the en 
banc majority, in conflict with the dissent, the panel, and the 
district court in most part, does not contain the thoughtful 
analysis purportedly required by the United States in other 
instances (such as Brough v. Appawora). 
B. Even with the concession by the United States, discussed 
below, that now undermines the holding of tljie Uncompahgre portion 
of the decision and the rational of the entire opinion of the en 
8 
banc majority, amici recognize that the task before this Court is 
still a substantial one. The opinions of tt^ e district court, the 
panel, and the en banc court are voluminous. The briefs submit-
ted in Ute Indian Tribe that appear as Volume XIX in the record 
here should be of some assistance in readily providing this Court 
with a convenient overview as well as an opportunity to view the 
p 
question from a proper historical perspective. Beyond that 
perspective, the Brief for Respondent Sta|:e of Utah aptly re-
counts the history of this litigation and tjhe significant points 
for the consideration of the Court and no attempt will be made 
here to again detail that material. One overriding observation, 
however, should be specifically noted befote briefly addressing 
several of the more significant deficiencies in the en banc 
opinion. 
There is no doubt that the recent linited States Supreme 
Court opinions in this area, in spite of protestations to the 
contrary from the Court itself, have sent out mixed signals that 
arguably support differing conclusions - especially if a court is 
result oriented in the first place and willing to decide the 
The recent admonition of the Unitedl States Supreme Court 
that Indian lands legislation not be given an interpretation 
"that conflicts with the fstatutes] central purpose and philoso-
phy" is instructive here. South Carolina et al. v. Catawba 
Indian Tribe, Inc., 476 U.S. 498 (1986). The only contemporary 
matter o? fact Historical perspective on legislation of this 
nature from the Court is Justice Hughes' excellent 1914 opinion 
in United States v. Pelican, 232 U.S. 442 (1914). See also Sioux 
Tribe of Indians v. United States, 316 U.Sj 317 (1942), as well 
as Sowards v. Meagher, 37 Utah 212, 108 P. 1112 (1910), and 
Whiterocks Irrigation Co. v. Mooseman, 45 Utah 79, 141 P. 459 
(1914) . 
9 
issue in a historical vacuum. What is important here is that 
this Court first recognize that the Ute documents fit squarely 
within the historical context of DeCoteau ajid Rosebud Sioux Tribe 
v. Kneip, 430 U.S. 584 (1977), (as the jiocuments and experts 
9 
expressly attest) - and then all that is Required of this Court 
is a documented opinion in support of that} conclusion. It will 
then be up to the United States Supreme Court, as it rightly 
should be, to grant certiorari and authoritatively resolve some 
of the inconsistencies that prompted this litigation in the first 
place, and also resolve the other inconsistencies that have 
continued to fuel this troublesome controversy for more than a 
decade. In this respect, the following point is especially 
worthy of the initial consideration of this Court. 
C. Amici recognize that the fact situation here involves 
the status of the original Uintah Reservation. As a practical 
matter, however, the status of the original Uncompahgre Reserva-
tion must at least be addressed, as it figured prominently in the 
9 
In several instances the Ute documents specifically cite 
the 1904 Rosebud documents construed in Rosebud Sioux Tribe v. Kn ip, 30 U.S. 584 (1977), as models or (precedents. See e.g
Ute Indian Tribe v. State of Utah, 521 F.Supp. 1072 at 1090, 
1125, 1129 (1981) . This is the Act that t|he Rosebud Court held 
reflected the baseline purpose of disestablishment in the Rosebud 
legislation. Even the author of the study that figured promi-
nently in the Solem opinion expressly recpgnized that the Utah 
Uintah Act and others "followed the model11 of this 1904 Rosebud 
Act. F. Hoxie, Beyond Savagery: The Campaign to Assimilate the 
American Indians, 1880-1920, at 390 (Univ. Microfilms 1977). See 
discussion of this point in the Brief foij the States of South 
Dakota, et al. as Amici Curiae in Support[ of Petitioners, Ute 
Indian Tribe, at 9, R. Vol. XIX, p. 27, Addendum at 115. This 
should also be the view of the United states Supreme Court. 
Brough was vacated expressly for further consideration in light 
oT Rosebud. Moreover, the Court did nor order a "reconsid-
eration" of Brough as requested by the United States. 
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en banc majority's opinion and its definitibn of the "Uintah and 
Ouray Indian Reservation". 
1# Subsequent to the decision of the en banc majority, the 
United States, after the time for rehearincj had expired, made a 
major concession before the United States Supreme Court that now 
undermines the crux of the entire majority Opinion, Namelyf that 
the United States, which has never failed to support the resur-
rection of original reservation boundaries before the United 
States Supreme Court, had no choice but to ^gree with the Defen-
dants that the Uncompahgre Reservation no longer exists; that 
these views of the United States "were not previously presented 
to the court of appeals"; and that as a result the court of 
appeals wrongly decided the Uncompahgre issue, Brief for the 
United States as Amicus Curiae, at 17-22, Ute Indian Tribe, R. 
Vol XIX, p. 18. 
Without any explanation for not fully] briefing this issue 
for the court of appeals, the United States' alternative solution 
to this dilemma was a half-hearted request for the Court to 
vacate the Judgment of the court of appeal^ and remand the case 
for further consideration of the status of the Uncompahgre 
Reservation to cure this defect. Brief for the United States as 
The Ute Indian Tribe today refers to the entire reserva-
tion as the Uintah and Ouray Reservation. Appellant variously 
described and submitted the "Indian Country" issue here in terms 
of "within the boundaries of the Uintah and Ouray Indian Reserva-
tion", the "bounds of the Indian Reservation", and "within the 
Uintah and Ouray Indian Reservation". Bri^f of Appellant at 5, 
R. 82, Memorandums of Points and Authorities in Support of 
Defendant's Motion to Dismiss at 1, 2, R. 83. 
11 
Amicus Curiae/ at 22. This alternative was, of course, tainted 
by the lack of candor of the United States in the first instance 
- especially in light of the observation of the United States 
that, at first glance, even the Uncompahgre portion of the court 
of appeals opinion "appears to rest upon the plausible applica-
tion of Solem", Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae, at 
18. 
Amici would submit that the only re^l dilemma the United 
States faced was in the court of appeals, rjamely, how to present 
a cogent (and very real) argument of Uncompahgre disestablishment 
that would not also undermine the Uintah ite-establishment posi-
tion - in a case where the legislative history, the surrounding 
circumstances, and the language of both acts, as well as the 
subsequent jurisdictional and other hist|ory, were all inex-
tricably intertwined and necessarily governed by the same rules 
of statutory construction and principles of federal Indian law. 
As a practical matter, the United States mu^t have concluded that 
this simply could not be done in the court of appeals (and so it 
wasn't). The United States remained silent on the Uncompahgre 
issue, both reservations were reestablished, and the rest of the 
story is almost history. Almost, because this Court now has the 
opportunity to independently assess the situation and express its 
own views. In this light, the precedential value of the en banc 
majority opinion is questionable at the outlet. 
2. This is especially so because in this review process, 
the flaw that misled the court of appeals to grant reservation 
status to Uncompahgre (despite "the absence of any acknowledgment 
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by Congress or the Department of the Interior since 1898 that the 
Uncompahgre Reservation still exists") (Bfrief for the United 
States as Amicus Curiae at 20), can be documented in the Uintah 
portion of the decision as well: the glare of the Solem "public 
domain" argument so blinded the court of ajppeals that a result 
was fashioned that conflicts in principle with all reservation 
disestablishment decisions of the United States Supreme Court, 
including Solem, 
It is not without significance that the Attorneys General of 
six states - California, Montana, New Mexico, South Dakota, 
Washington and Wyoming - states not unfamiliar with questions of 
federal Indian law, also noted that the $n banc majority had 
premised its entire decision on the same fundamental miscon-
struction of the significance of "public domain" language as a 
result of misreading Solem, Brief for the States of South 
Dakota, et al. as Amici Curiae in Support ofj Petitioners, at 1-2. 
Ute Indian Tribe, R. Vol. XIX, p. 27, Addendum at 102. The en 
banc majority's conclusion in this regard is explicitly stated: 
The original expression 'return to the public domain' 
does not reliably establish the clear and unequivocal 
evidence of Congress's intent to change boundaries. 
Solem, 104 S.Ct. at 1166 [majority opinion] 773 F.2d at 
1092 (emphasis added). 
Our conclusion is that the phrase 'restore to the 
public domain' is not the same as a congressional state 
of mind to disestablish [majority opinion] 773 F.2d at 
1092 (emphasis added). 
Although the district court and the panel viewed this 
as language of cession, I believe that Solem dictates a 
different result [concurring opinion] 773 F.2d at 109 5 
(emphasis added). 
Prior to Solem, 'public domain1 language could have 
been construed as more conclusive evidence of disestab-
13 
lishment; following Solem, the term mtist be viewed as 
ambiguous in portent...[concurring opinion] 773 F.2d at 
1095 (emphasis added). 
Ultimately, I interpret Solem to hold that 'public 
domain' language standing alone is insufficient to 
support a finding of explicit congressional intent to 
disestablish [concurring opinion] 77$ F.2d at 10 95, 
cert, denied, (emphasis added). 
Solem did not dictate this principle, as the Brief of Respondent 
State of Utah at 18, 22 - 26, 42 also aptl^ documents. Although 
the en banc majority addressed other pointls, it is evident that 
the ultimate conclusion regarding Uintah, a$ well as Uncompahgre, 
centered around this fundamental misconstruction. 
From a different perspective, historians and other profes-
sionals interested in western history haye also had occasion 
recently to address the disestablishment cases, including Ute 
Indian Tribe. Again the decision did not| receive a favorable 
review. In a joint paper delivered to the Annual Conference of 
the Western History Association in Billing$, Montana, on October 
17, 1986, entitled: Congressional Intent Regarding Jurisdiction 
on Ceded Indian Land During the Allotment Era, Part I-History, 
Part II-The Law, the opinion of the en banc majority was crit-
icized on several grounds: 
Subsequent decisions by the Tenth Circuit, particularly 
the en banc court, have largely ignored the vast wealth 
of historical data available in the trial record, 
relying on language rather than legislative history, 
and a strained interpretation of Solem in arriving at 
its anti-disestablishment decision... 
The en banc majority refused to analyse the 'surround-
ing circumstances' and 'legislative history' factors 
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which the Rosebud court set forth in its. standard for 
interpreting surplus land enactments..^. 
If the issues here were not so substantial, such sustained 
criticism as noted supra would arguably be of little conse-
12 quence. In light of what is at risk, however, these and other 
patent defects in the en banc majority opinion should not be 
allowed to stand unchallenged by this Courtf 
3. The United States also bears the responsibility for a 
further failing in the court of appeals. In 1957, the United 
States and the Ute Indian Tribe stipulated in the court of claims 
that the Uintah lands in dispute here were in fact "restored to 
the public domain" and the area in question designated a "former" 
reservation. Uintah and White River Bands of Ute Indians v. 
United States, 139 Ct. CI. 1 (1957). See, Supplemental Brief for 
Petitioners at 5-6, Ute Indian Tribe, R. Vol. XIX, p. 31. The en 
banc majority opinion does not address the point. 
4. One significant subject the en banc majority does 
address, was not even an issue. 
...this writer agreed...who generally ruled that the 
Uintah Reservation and its lands remained the property 
of the tribes that are involved. As to the question of 
whether the acts dealing with the Uint&h Forest and the 
Uncompahgre Reservation mean that the Indians lost 
title to these lands, the view of this writer Is 
contrary to the view of the trial cour^ :. 
Hoover and LaFave, Congressional Iiltent Regarding Juris-
diction on Ceded Indian Land During the Allotment Era, Part I: 
History and Part II; The Law, joint paper delivered to the 
Western History Association, in Billings, Montana (Oct. 17, 
1986)(Part II, The Law 19-20). 
12 . . . 
Also see Brief Amicus Curiae of Sarita Fe Mining, Inc. in 
Support of the Petition for Certiorari, Ute Indian Tribe, R. Vol. 
XIX, p~ T%~. The United States filed t^ ie only amicus brief 
supporting the en banc majority opinion. 
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Ute Indian Tribe v. State of Utah, 773 F.2d 1087 at 1088 (10th 
Cir. 1985) cert. denied. The parties in jute Indian Tribe were 
not contesting the title to the lands involved. 
5. Amici would conclude with a fina^ L point that typifies 
the jurisdictional history of the area in question. The United 
States was instrumental in convincing the en banc majority that 
the Ashley and Uinta National Forests and the High Uinta Wilder-
ness have always been administered and considered as within the 
boundaries of an Indian reservation. Yet in 19 77, the Forest 
Service stated in a letter to the Governor of Utah that this 
national forest was not part of an Indian reservation. The 
Forest Service concluded that "We believ^ the original Uintah 
Reservation boundaries were disestablished and the present 
Reservation boundaries include only the trust lands". Letter 
from United States Forest Service to Scott M. Matheson, Governor 
of Utah, (Apr. 8, 1977), (Supplemental Bjrief for Petitioners, 
Addendum B. at 25-26, Ute Indian Tribe, and discussion in Supple-
mental Brief at 8-9) . The position of the Forest Service was 
subsequently ignored by the United States. On the basis of the 
claim of original reservation boundaries, the Ute Tribe has 
insisted upon special hunting and fishiuig rights within the 
national forest, full control of camping and recreation on 
989,000 acres, and the right to be consulted regarding all plans 
of the Forest Service pertaining to camping|, boating, fishing and 
other forms of public recreation. Supplemental Brief for Peti-
tioners at 9-10. 
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The boundaries of the or ig ina l Uncompahgre and the o r i g i n a l 
Uintah Reservation no longer e x i s t - de jurje or de f a c t o . 
CONCLUSION 
The lower court should be affirmed. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 1st day of July, 1988. 
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